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Abstract Although it is now generally acknowledged that
new biomedical technologies often produce new deﬁnitions
and sometimes even new concepts of disease, this obser-
vation is rarely used in research that anticipates potential
ethical issues in emerging technologies. This article argues
that it is useful to start with an analysis of implied concepts
of disease when anticipating ethical issues of biomedical
technologies. It shows, moreover, that it is possible to do so
at an early stage, i.e. when a technology is only just
emerging. The speciﬁc case analysed here is that of
‘molecular medicine’. This group of emerging technologies
combines a ‘cascade model’ of disease processes with a
‘personal pattern’ model of bodily functioning. Whereas the
ethical implications of the ﬁrst are partly familiar from
earlier—albeit controversial—forms of preventive and
predictive medicine, those of the second are quite novel and
potentially far-reaching.
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Introduction
It has often been observed in history and philosophy of
medicine, as well as in philosophy of technology that new
biomedical technologies frequently produce redeﬁnitions
or even new concepts of ‘disease’. History of medicine
shows that novel diagnostic as well as therapeutic tech-
nologies tend to reorganize the way we conceive speciﬁc
diseases (see for examples: Reiser 1978; Davis 1981;
Dillmann 1990; Pasveer 1992). Philosophers of medicine
have argued that technology constitutes the concept of
disease. Hofmann (2001b), for example, argues that tech-
nology provides the entities that are applied in deﬁning
disease, constitutes the signs, markers and end points of
disease, inﬂuences explanatory models, and establishes
how we act towards disease (see also Hoedemaekers and
Have 1999; Horstman et al. 1999; Stempsey 2006a). This is
in accord with insights from philosophy of technology in
general, which state that new technologies often produce
new ontologies, new roles and new responsibilities (Wil-
lems 1995; Vos and Willems 2000).
The technological constitution of disease (and by
implication, of health) has raised extensive philosophical
debates, for example on the descriptive or normative
character of disease deﬁnitions, on their ontological or
conventionalist character and on the relation between dis-
ease and illness (Schaffner 2000; Hofmann 2001a; Torres
2002; Engelhardt and Wildes 2003; Kushf 2006; Norden-
felt 2007; Tengland 2007). Testament to the ongoing
debate in this ﬁeld is a recent thematic issue of this journal
(Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 2007 no. 1).
It has been argued that such conceptual analysis of the
use of ‘disease’ and ‘health’ is hardly linked to ethical
analysis. Schramme, for example, suggests that conceptual
analysis of ‘health’ is curiously lacking in biomedical
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constituent of a good life (Schramme 2007, p. 3). We might
add that the lack of this type of analysis is even more
remarkable in ethics of (emerging) biomedical technolo-
gies. Despite the steady increase in research in the area of
ethical, legal and social aspects of new technologies, and
notwithstanding the growing attention to ethics in (Health)
Technology Assessment (Willems 1995; Grunwald 1999,
2000; Decker 2004; Oortwijn et al. 2004; Hofmann 2005;
Lehoux and Williams-Jones 2007; Hofmann 2008), ethical
analyses of novel biomedical technologies only rarely
include analyses of the concept of disease and/or health
implied by these new technologies.
As Hofmann (2008) and Stempsey (2006a, b) have
shown, analysis of implied concepts of disease and/or
health might be quite relevant to ethical debates on new
and emerging technologies. Stempsey argues that emerging
biomedical technologies continuously shift our norms of
disease and health, thus bringing about new conceptions of
health. In his view, such innovations ‘‘will inevitably
challenge us and lead us into ethical challenges’’ (2006b,
p. 241). In a different paper, he argues that genetic diag-
nostics presents ethical challenges because it relies on a
neo-ontological concept of disease that is particularly
problematic in a context of genetic reductionism (2006a).
Hofmann, who has published both on the concept of dis-
ease (2001a, b) and on the role of ethics in Health Tech-
nology Assessment (Hofmann 2005, 2008), recently
presented ten arguments why ethics should be integrated in
HTA. The last argument is that ‘‘technology invents dis-
ease and its remedies. Accordingly, analytical perspectives
that address this profound role of technology should be
welcomed in the assessment of technology in a ﬁeld so
crucial to human beings as health care’’ (Hofmann 2008,
p.427).Neither StempseynorHofmann,however,discusses
howsuchananalysiscouldbeperformed,nordotheygointo
any detail regarding the additional value it might have to
existing approaches in ethical technology assessment.
In this paper, I want to explore further the position that
analysis of the concept of disease might be useful for ethics
of biomedical technology, in particular for technologies
just emerging. First, I will develop two arguments indi-
cating why an analysis of implied concepts of disease and/
or health may be useful for ethical agenda setting. Such an
analysis may identify shifts in the goals of medical prac-
tice, even when a new technology is said to be just a more
effective means towards a pre-established goal. In addition,
such shifts enable the early anticipation of ethical issues
associated with emerging technologies, since they are
already discernable in the visions preceding and guiding
the development of these technologies.
In the remainder of the article, I will illustrate this claim
by analysing how the technologies emerging under the
denominator of ‘molecular medicine’ change existing
concepts of disease.
1 The ﬁeld of molecular medicine is
particularly interesting because although it is only just
emerging, it appears to have the potential to radically
transform medical practice. The goal of the case study is
twofold: on the one hand it is meant as a ﬁrst step in setting
an agenda for ethical debate on molecular medicine; on the
other hand it may serve to demonstrate the value and
identify potential problems and weaknesses of the general
approach. After reviewing both the current status of
molecular medicine and its visions of the future, I will
analyse the concepts of disease implicit in these develop-
ments and visions. This concept analysis will then be used
to identify some of the ethical issues that might be involved.
After summarizing the ethical agenda for molecular medi-
cine thus produced, I will end with some general reﬂections
on the usefulness of analysis of the ‘disease’ concept for
anticipating ethical aspects of emerging technologies.
Concept analysis for ethical HTA
My claim, that an analysis of the concept(s) of disease
implied by emerging biomedical technologies could be of
great value when setting an agenda for ethical debate on
these technologies, stems from two considerations:
1. An analysis of the concepts of health and disease
envisioned in the development of emerging technolo-
gies enables debate about the desirability of (potential
shifts in) the goals of medicine.
2. In addition, such an analysis can be performed at an
early stage of technology development, thus maxi-
mizing the potential impact of ethical debate.
These arguments build on insights from philosophy of
technology in general, as well as philosophy of biomedical
technology. I will explain them brieﬂy.
Technology and the goals of medicine
As Swierstra and Rip have shown in debates on new and
emerging technologies, proponents often argue that this
particular technology offers new, more effective or less
burdensome ways to realize familiar, widely valued goals
(Swierstra and Rip 2007, p. 9). This is certainly true for
debates on biomedical technologies. New biomedical
1 Although my general argument claims that technology may affect
the conceptualization of both disease and health, for pragmatic
reasons the case analysis will mainly focus on an analysis of the
disease concept. Of course the two are interrelated and where the
conceptualization of disease has consequences for or is dependent on
a speciﬁc notion of health, I will note so.
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mortality and/or promoting health—widely shared values
that are difﬁcult to take issue with. Moreover, new bio-
medical technologies are often claimed to be more effec-
tive in realizing these goals, to have fewer side effects and/
or to be less burdensome to the patient. New technology is
thus put forward as a new or even ‘revolutionary’ instru-
ment to realize traditional, widely shared goals. As
Swierstra and Rip suggest, this way of arguing is particu-
larly useful to ward off moral debate on new technologies.
After all, if its goals are familiar and uncontroversial, a new
technology can claim at least an initial moral legitimacy.
The question then is: are the goals really familiar and
uncontroversial? Philosophers of technology urge us to be
cautious here. Technological means are more than just
neutral instruments; they act themselves (Ihde 1990; Ver-
beek 2005, pp. 43–45). While trying to realize familiar
goals with different means, new technologies actually shift
or reinterpret the goals—often in ways that are not
immediately visible. Technology mediates both the way we
experience the world and the way we act in it. This
becomes clearer when we realize that technology is not just
a material device: it is a socio-technical complex that
consists of mutually dependent material and human ele-
ments. Much work needs to be done to make a material
device effective; it presupposes a speciﬁc context of use.
Moreover, in doing so, it redeﬁnes the relevant actors, their
roles and responsibilities, and even the other material
objects that are part of the technological practice. Thus we
may end up with a world that is quite different from the one
before the new technology was introduced.
Let me illustrate this with an example from the domain
of biomedical technology, taken from Willems (1995, pp.
47–65). A spirometer, used to test lung function, is a large
apparatus that requires an assistant to make sure the patient
blows in the right way and to interpret results. Patients
have to come to the lab to be tested, which is particularly
problematic in the event of a sudden deterioration when
instant testing is necessary. In addition, the characteristics
of the spirometer impede its use in epidemiological
research on large populations. These considerations led to
the development of the peak ﬂow meter (or actually to
several different ones), i.e. small devices that can be used
by general practitioners as well as patients themselves to
measure lung function. One might thus assume that these
peak ﬂow meters are just better instruments to serve the
same goal.
However, lung function measurement was actually
transformed by the introduction of the peak ﬂow meter.
Creating its own parameter, ‘peak expiratory ﬂow’ was
installed as the deﬁnition of lung function together with the
development of the device. In addition, the peak ﬂow meter
created new roles and responsibilities for patient and
physician, who now had to produce and interpret test out-
comes together. With the patient now able to monitor his/
her own bodily functioning, information could be obtained
that might even redeﬁne the boundary between normal and
abnormal on a highly individual level. In addition, self-
management programmes were developed in which the
roles of physician and patient and their relationship were
again transformed.
The innovation of lung function measuring technology
cannot thus be seen as a miniaturization of an existing
instrument meant to attain an existing goal. In the process
of miniaturization, new entities, roles, responsibilities and
practices were produced. The former goal was transformed
but also yielded many additional effects which would be
wrong to denote as mere ‘side effects’. The lesson to be
drawn from this is that we should not accept claims at face
value that a particular novel biomedical technology is just a
neutral instrument for a predetermined or an accepted goal.
Even when the goals guiding the development of a tech-
nology are familiar and acceptable, a technology may
actually shift the meaning of ‘disease’ and/or ‘health’.
Moreover, it is possible to reorganize the world in such a
way that these transformed concepts make sense.
It is thus advisable to ask which concept of disease and/
or health is implied in any emerging biomedical technol-
ogy. Subsequently, it should be asked how these concepts
differ from existing ideas about disease and health and
what the implications of such changes might be. This may
result in an agenda for debate on the desirability of such
changes.
Possibilities for early analysis and debate
An additional argument for the value of such a concept
analysis for ethical agenda setting is that it may have more
impact because it can be performed relatively early in the
technology development process. It is widely acknowl-
edged that ethical and social assessment of emerging
technologies is important but that the timing of such an
endeavour is problematic because of the so-called Col-
lingridge dilemma (Collingridge 1980). If one assesses a
new technology after it has been developed, opportunities
for shaping it are limited. By then, the design of the
technology has usually stabilized and the only decision left
is to accept or reject the technology as a whole. Moreover,
because of the time, energy and money spent in develop-
ing the technology, the pressure to accept it is often great.
In theory, it is thus preferable to assess the potential
impact of emerging technologies at an early stage, when
there are more opportunities for steering. However, early
steering poses difﬁculties as well since the object of
assessment is still ﬂuid and its effects are difﬁcult to
foresee.
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is ‘vision assessment’ (Grin and Grunwald 2000). Instead
of assessing novel technologies only after they emerge,
Grin and Grunwald propose to assess the visions underly-
ing and guiding technology development ﬁrst. Such visions
include images of the material devices to be designed, but
also of the practices in which these devices would be put to
use, and sometimes they even evoke images of the result-
ing society or culture. Since these visions usually precede
technology development, assessing them early on enables
public debate about future technologies, thus contributing
to the democratization of technology development.
The concept analysis proposed here can be seen as part
of such a vision assessment. Instead of waiting for a
technology to emerge and then to start analysing the
implied concept of disease and health, one could take the
explicit visions of future technology as a starting point. As
stated above, visions of future biomedical technologies
usually include relatively speciﬁc claims regarding the
reduction of disease, suffering and mortality, and/or the
promotion of health; but they also contain images of future
medical practice, of future patients (or healthy human
beings, for that matter), and of society at large. Analysing
the concepts of disease and/or health implied by these
visions contributes to the early agenda setting for timely
ethical debate on emerging technologies.
Molecular medicine: possibilities and promises
Since the proof of the pudding is in the eating, I will use the
remainder of this article to put the approach outlined above
into practice. The emerging ﬁeld of molecular medicine
will serve as a test case. Molecular medicine is a relatively
new, internationally ﬂourishing ﬁeld of science and, to a
lesser extent, of business. Whereas a journal and some
research institutes were already established during the
1990s, most research institutes, master’s programmes,
funding opportunities and commercial start-ups were ini-
tiated only recently. The subject matter of the ﬁeld is wide
ranging, as are its ambitions. To quote some deﬁnitions
used by the ﬁeld itself:
Considered the vanguard of the new millennium in
which science truly complements the art of medicine,
Molecular Medicine strives to understand the mole-
cules key to normal body functioning and the path-
ogenesis of disease, and based on that knowledge, to
design speciﬁc molecular tools for diagnosis, treat-
ment and prevention. (from the website of the journal
Molecular Medicine, http://www.molmed.org/about.
html, accessed March 20, 2008)
Molecular Medicine targets disease where it is
caused: at the level of the gene or the gene product in
the critical cell. It enables not only earlier and more
precise detection of diseases and even predisposition,
but also personalized treatments that are more
effective, cause fewer side effects, and are more cost-
effective due to stratiﬁcation of speciﬁc patient risk
and prediction of response to therapy. (CTMM
Working Group 2006,p .1 1 )
Molecular medicine aims to diagnose and manipulate the
molecular processes underlying disease and health. Central
in all its activities is the knowledge of biological function-
ing of human beings at the most basic level. Both this type
of knowledge and the possibilities to intervene in these
processes have become available only by the convergence
of biomedical science with nanotechnology and information
and communication technologies. Whereas nanotechnology
makes visible and enables manipulation of biological
processes at the molecular level, Information and Commu-
nication Technology (ICT) helps to collect the information
produced by nanotechnological instruments in huge dat-
abases, to analyse it and to recognize relevant patterns. Both
nanotechnology and ICT thus create the conditions to gain
fundamental biomedical knowledge and to use it in
diagnosis and therapy.
Current literature on molecular medicine attributes
ﬁve different, often interconnected, goals to molecular
medicine.
1. Diagnosing disease earlier and with greater reli-
ability: Molecular diagnostic devices are claimed to enable
the detection of very low concentrations of biochemical
substances indicating the start of disease processes. The
company Nanosphere, for example, is developing a test
that recognizes proteins produced by dying heart cells
(TWA Netwerk 2006, p. 48). Nanoparticles with a speciﬁc
coating bind to these proteins and subsequently to a micro-
array with a similar coating, which makes them detectable
by a digital camera. This test is thought to enable the
detection of heart disease at a very early stage. Similar
applications are being developed for different forms of
cancer and other diseases (Health Council of the Nether-
lands 2006, p. 48; TWA Netwerk 2006, p. 51). The idea is
not only that detection of low concentrations aids timely
diagnosis but that it might also improve the reliability of
diagnostic tests. In practice, however, this goal is not very
easy to realize (Roszek et al. 2005, p. 54).
2. Improving the reliability of prognosis and reducing
over-/undertreatment: Molecular devices may also contrib-
ute to tailoring treatments to the molecular characteristics of
a patient’s disease. Several DNA-chips using micro-array
techniques have been developed that can differenti-
ate between women with favourable and unfavourable
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2007, pp. 75–76). Only women with a bad prognosis are
thus prescribed chemotherapy, whereas all women used to
be treated this way, just to be on the safe side. Such prog-
nostic DNA-chips may considerably reduce overtreatment.
This is an advantage for the women involved, who are
spared the awful side effects of chemotherapy, but also from
an economic perspective. Similar DNA-chips are in the
experimental stages of development, e.g. for leukaemia and
cancer of the mouth and throat. Clinical applications are
still rare, however (Health Council of the Netherlands 2006,
p. 45).
3. Improving the effectiveness of therapies: Advancing
and improving the reliability of diagnosis and prognosis
may of course contribute to the effectiveness of therapies.
However, molecular medicine may also improve the
effectiveness of therapies more directly. Drugs for brain
tumours that use nanoparticles in combination with
directing molecules, for example, can pass through the
blood–brain barrier. Such ‘drug delivery systems’ make
drugs more effective and often reduce side effects because
substances only do their work where they are needed
(Health Council of the Netherlands 2006, p. 51). In addi-
tion, systems are being developed for ‘nanoplatforms’ with
modules for different functions. This opens up the possi-
bility of combining sensors for detection with the exact and
timely release of active substances, thus combining diag-
nosis or monitoring with therapeutic functions (Roszek
et al. 2005, pp. 46–47).
4. Reducing the invasiveness or burden of diagnostic
and therapeutic technologies: It is characteristic of nano-
technology that it enables the miniaturization of medical
instruments and devices for both diagnostics and therapy.
As a result, these devices are becoming less invasive and
can be transported more easily. In the case of diagnostics,
for example, blood analysis may replace biopsies. The
instruments needed to perform such an analysis are
becoming so minute that they can also be used outside the
lab or clinic. ‘Labs on a chip’ currently enable so-called
‘point of care’-applications: lab analysis may be performed
at a patient’s bedside or at home, making results available
much faster (Health Council of the Netherlands 2006,
p. 47; TWA Netwerk 2006, pp. 48–49; European Group on
Ethics 2007, p. 16). Medical instruments might also be so
small that they can enter the body. So-called ‘wet sensors’
in the form of an ingestible chip measuring heart beat,
temperature and blood sugar level are already available
(European Group on Ethics 2007, p. 16). Such chips are
combined with RFID labels, which can be ‘read’ at a
distance without the carrier’s noticing it. Future molecular
medicine might well lead to forms of diagnostics and
therapeutic intervention for which a patient hardly needs to
interrupt his/her life.
5. Monitoring health and personalized care: Molecular
diagnostics enables repeated monitoring of bodily func-
tions, because it is neither very invasive nor burdensome. A
lab on a chip is already available for patients using psy-
chopharmaceutical drugs such as lithium. These patients
can regularly monitor their blood lithium levels and dose
their drug use accordingly (Health Council of the Nether-
lands 2006, p. 47). More futuristic promises suggest that if
wet sensors were implanted in the body and measurement
results were then sent to some huge, distant database (for
example by using Radio Frequency IDentity (RFID) chips),
information about an individual’s functioning could be
charted quite easily. Analysis of individual patterns and
comparisons between individuals could hence construe a
balanced image of someone’s functioning, enabling timely
and tailored interventions. A patient whose results deviate
from his usual pattern might receive a message on his
mobile phone urging him to consult his physician; one
might even start monitoring important biomarkers in
healthy people to improve early diagnostics (Schuurman
et al. 2007).
The ultimate vision: monitoring health anywhere,
anytime
An overview of the different goals and applications is
given in Table 1. The distinction between the goals is often
analytical, however. In the most radical visions of what
molecular medicine might entail monitoring, early diag-
nostics, prevention and/or tailored therapy are combined in
an all-encompassing system of vigilance, which is pre-
sented as hardly burdensome to its users. Such a system
would extend the care for health over time as well as in
space. Molecular medicine may be active 24 h a day, from
the cradle to the grave:
Future applications of nanobiotechnology include
development of in vivo sensors. Nano-sized devices
are envisaged that could be ingested or injected into
the body, where they could act as reporters of in vivo
concentrations of key analytes. These devices would
have a capability for sensing and transmitting data to
an external data capture system. The constant vigi-
lance of these devices would provide a real-time, 24/7
scrutiny of the state of a person’s health. (Fortina
et al. 2005, pp. 172–173)
Ultimately, it might beenvisioned that when aninfant is
born,abloodsamplewillbecollectedforthepurposeof
determining the baby’s genome. The information will
then be used throughout that person’s life to guide
primary prevention strategies, make diagnoses on
a molecular basis, and individualize drug therapy.
(Johnson and Evans 2002, pp. 304–305)
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health: in the future, one may be the object of care
anywhere.
The integration of minimally invasive diagnostics
with information technology for remote monitoring
of the patient’s condition may produce a radical shift
of the point of care from the hospital or clinic to the
home. (Rickerby 2006, cited in European Group on
Ethics 2007, pp. 16–17)
This pervasiveness of health care is an outstanding
example of what ‘converging technologies’ might do.
First, the convergence between biomedical science and
nanotechnology makes it possible to transport medical
technology from the laboratory and the clinic to the public
and the private spheres. ICT adds to this development by
making the analysis and reporting of test results mobile. As
a result, we can be monitored anywhere, anytime.
What’s new?
Although molecular medicine is frequently labelled ‘rev-
olutionary’ by its proponents, the aforementioned goals of
molecular medicine are not so new after all. Most of them
are related to improving diagnosis of disease (with respect
to timing and reliability), prognosis (with respect to reli-
ability) and treatment (reduction of over-/undertreatment,
improving effectiveness, reducing side effects and burden).
Only the last goal, monitoring health and personalizing
care, is relatively young—although not completely novel.
On the level of its explicit goals, molecular medicine thus
hopes to make the activities usually undertaken to combat
disease and restore health more effective. The value of
‘health’ and the undesirability of disease are taken for
granted, just as in ‘traditional’ forms of medicine.
The more encompassing visions of the future enabled by
molecular medicine slightly shift the focus of attention
from ﬁghting disease to maintaining health: they accentu-
ate the prediction, prevention and monitoring of health
risks. These goals have also been around for some time
with prediction and prevention having been pursued on a
large scale, even since the nineteenth century. Monitoring
is hardly a goal in itself; it can be seen as a new means to
make prediction and prevention more effective.
Does this mean then that molecular medicine is only
building on widely shared goals? Not necessarily. As
argued above, emerging biomedical technologies are often
likely to shift or reinterpret the goals of medicine, even if
they pretend to be just more effective means towards well
known and widely accepted goals. An analysis of the
concepts of disease implicit in these emerging technologies
can indicate which shifts molecular medicine is likely to
accomplish.
Shifting concepts of disease
It is not very bold to state that scientiﬁc and technological
developments in molecular medicine will lead to redeﬁni-
tions of diseases. The meaning of diseases in general will
become more closely connected to the basic biological
processes opened up by molecular medicine. If large-scale
biobank research actually does identify ‘biomarkers’ rela-
ted to the onset or development of speciﬁc diseases, these
biomarkers will become part of the deﬁnitions used for
speciﬁc diseases, either broadening or differentiating them.
An individual receiving a positive result on a micro-array
for heart disease has this heart disease, whereas until
recently his General Practitioner would have sent him away
with the reassurance that nothing was wrong (or more
precisely: that nothing could be found). If research subse-
quently shows that the molecular processes in these
a-symptomatic patients differ from those in symptomatic
patients, a new disease differentiation may be born.
Reconﬁgurations like these will occur on the level of
speciﬁc diseases and their deﬁnitions. However, such
reconﬁgurations are likely to show a similar pattern since
molecular medicine stimulates a speciﬁc way of thinking
Table 1 Goals and examples of current and future applications in molecular medicine
Goal Examples of existing
applications
Examples of applications
in development
Earlier and more reliable diagnosis Micro arrays for heart disease Micro arrays for different forms
of cancer
More reliable prognosis and reduction
of over-/undertreatment
DNA chips, micro arrays for breast
cancer
DNA chips for leukaemia, mouth
and throat cancer
Improving effectiveness of therapies Drug delivery systems Drug delivery systems for brain
disease, nanoplatforms, theranostics
Minimizing invasiveness and burden
of medical technology
Lab on a chip for monitoring
lithium levels
Lab on a chip for colon cancer
detection; wet sensors
Monitoring health and personalizing
care
Ingestible pill monitoring body
temperature
Wet sensor systems, including RFID
technology and databases
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two general characteristics of the way molecular medicine
conceptualizes disease: (1) the use of a ‘cascade model’ of
disease, and (2) the use of what I will call a ‘personal
pattern model’ of bodily functioning.
Disease as a cascade
As stated above, the ideal guiding most molecular diag-
nostics is that biomarkers reveal the very ﬁrst stages of the
disease process. These molecular changes are supposed to
cause further changes, e.g. on the tissue level, then on the
level of organs etc., and ultimately lead to symptoms and
complaints. Ideally, molecular medicine would generate
knowledge of and insight into the natural history of dis-
eases. This knowledge would then enable us to intervene at
the right time: neither too early nor too late. The speciﬁc
concept of disease underpinning such claims is that of the
‘cascade’: one step leads to another, in a stream that with
each subsequent step becomes more difﬁcult to stop. The
image of the cascade is essential for molecular medicine’s
claim that early diagnosis (and prevention or intervention)
improves the chances of recovery or of staying healthy. The
longer one waits, the more difﬁcult it will be to turn the tide.
Approaching disease as a cascade, molecular medicine
brings the disease process into focus and highlights the
temporal development of diseases as well as the relations
between cause and effect in each stage of this process. In
doing so, molecular medicine’s concept of disease goes
beyond the simple ontological view of disease as an altered
state (as present in, for example, traditional pathology) by
investigating the process preceding and following the
occurrence of such altered states. It also transcends the
epidemiological reasoning underlying most predictive and
preventive medicine to date by aiming to elucidate the
actual process explaining the correlations between risk
factors and disease.
It is doubtful, however, whether the cascade model of
disease is fruitful in guiding medical research and practice.
First, it is all too easily (though not necessarily) interpreted
in a linear way, limiting the focus of research and
neglecting the complexities and contingencies of disease.
Disease processes may not evolve in a linear way: the
processes may include feedback loops or complex inter-
actions that are difﬁcult or downright impossible to predict,
and these interactions may have different end points
without clinical relevance (Philippe and Mansi 1998).
Moreover, there is an implicit tension in the cascade model
that may prevent the realization of its promises. The cas-
cade model inspires a search for biomarkers that enable
early diagnosis, which, if found, will elongate the time
span between (observed) cause and effect, thus increasing
the chance of a surprising turn of events. For the moment
the relation between known biomarkers and the clinical
manifestation of the related disease is hardly ever auto-
matic. Only a number of those individuals testing positive
on a biomarker actually contracts the related disease later
on and shows the predicted disease history (Chanock and
Wacholder 2002). So, contrary to what the cascade model
suggests, biomarkers do not, in effect, betray the onset of a
disease; they predict it. Like traditional risk factors, they
help medical professionals to estimate chances of speciﬁc
events, but cannot offer certainty.
Personal patterns of bodily functioning
The second characteristic of the way molecular diagnostics
conceptualizes disease does not result from the substance of
what is being measured, but from the way this measurement
is performed. As indicated above, molecular medicine may
radically transform both the time and the location of med-
ical activities: it seems to enable the permanent monitoring
of bodily functioning in everyday life. Promises about
implantable medical instruments and reading measured
values from a distance are crucial here. If these promises do
come true, the concept of disease may become based on
deviations from personal patterns, reconstructed from col-
lected evidence on individual functioning.
Most medical diagnostics, either in vitro or in vivo, is
currently limited to measuring someone’s bodily state at a
speciﬁc moment in time. This is well recognized not only
by physicians themselves but also in theoretical reﬂections
on diagnostic work. As Bowker and Star state in their book
on classiﬁcation: ‘‘The body itself is constantly in motion
and varies by individual, so ideal measurement is always a
projection from a moving picture onto a timeless chart’’
(Bowker and Star 2000, p. 170). Repeating measurements
or examinations might improve the reliability of diagnosis;
repeating them regularly might help to form a picture of
how a disease is developing. In practice, however, repeated
measurements or examinations are difﬁcult to realize.
Often they are too burdensome for the patient, as well as
too expensive.
Developments in molecular medicine might change this
situation. If molecular diagnostics succeeds in developing
small (or even ‘wet’) sensors that can register minor
changes in protein levels or RNA activity, it will be easier
to repeat measurements and to monitor individuals for
longer stretches of time. Such intensive and relatively
unobtrusive monitoring of individuals might lead to a
radical change in the determination of ‘normal’ bodily
functioning, and thus affect the boundary between health
and disease. Until now normal values have been based on
population research and indicate mean functioning of a
group of individuals at a speciﬁc moment. Repeated mea-
suring with implantable sensors might, in contrast, reveal
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relevant ﬁeld of comparison for isolated measurements
would then not be the population but personal bodily his-
tory (Mol and Hendriks 1995). What is a deviant result for
one individual may be quite normal for another. The pre-
dictive value of biomarkers would thus not be interpreted
in the light of reference populations, but in comparison
with the individual’s former values. Close monitoring of an
individual’s functioning would moreover allow for tailor-
ing the timing of an intervention to the individual case.
Intensive monitoring of individuals might thus result in a
highly personal boundary between health and disease.
Early diagnostics through monitoring: the lifelong
health clinic
The two tendencies in molecular medicine set out above
will probably not fully evolve together. Although they are
interdependent, at least to some extent, the cascade model
of disease will be reinforced especially if the search for
biomarkers is successful, whereas personalization of the
boundary between health and disease depends on the
development of wet sensors and systems to transmit and
analyse the information produced. More likely than not,
these technologies will differ in their pace of development.
It is worthwhile, nevertheless, to speculate brieﬂy how
these tendencies may inﬂuence one another and how they
might combine. First, the model of the cascade might be an
important impetus to develop possibilities for the contin-
uous monitoring of individuals. It fosters the idea that
human beings are vulnerable to disease and that bodily
processes can go wrong any moment. Moreover, it is linked
to the idea that the ability of human subjects to experience
and note changes in bodily functioning is limited, whereas
medical technology can identify changes that an individual
would not have been aware of. The results produced by
such a technology have the additional advantage that they
can be transported and compared with the results of others
much more easily than people’s personal reports on bodily
experience. This seems to make diagnosis more ‘objec-
tive’, but it comes at a cost. As indicated above, diagnostic
technology usually replaces the continuous, temporal
character of personal experience with momentary images.
This complicates the interpretation of test results; a com-
plication that might be relieved if individuals were con-
tinuously monitored. The two tendencies might thus be
combined in a practice of continuous monitoring of all
individuals with the aim to diagnose disease from the
onset. ‘Lifelong health clinics’ could organize permanent
monitoring of a set of biomarkers in all citizens by means
of wet sensors that are read at a distance. Data about bodily
processes would be stored and charted in digital ﬁles.
Ideally, the monitoring system itself would be able to note
deviations from personal patterns and to send a message to
the person involved. Depending on the character and
seriousness of the observed deviation and the complexities
involved in its interpretation, this person might receive
some advice on lifestyle habits or be invited for a consul-
tation with a medical professional. If drugs were pre-
scribed, their effect could be monitored as well.
Ethical implications of shifting concepts of disease
On the basis of the analysis presented above, we can now
conclude that the visions of molecular medicine on the one
hand reinforce earlier shifts in the conceptualization of
disease, and introduce new shifts on the other. This means
that this group of technologies is not value neutral, offering
new, more effective means to realize existing goals. It
affects the goals themselves—in which case ethical reﬂec-
tion and debate on the desirability of such transformations is
in order. As indicated earlier, we should question the
desirability of the changed goals, but we should also look at
the conditions that need to be met to make the technologies
work since these may lead to additional, unintended effects.
If we combine these two types of ethical questions with
the two tendencies in the conceptualization of disease in
molecular medicine, a preliminary four-item agenda for
ethical debate on molecular medicine can be compiled. The
implied cascade model of disease raises (1) issues regard-
ing the desirability of knowledge of future health risks and
(2) issues regarding the uncertain status of this knowledge.
These items are not completely new, but regain urgency in
the context of molecular medicine. The personal pattern
model of bodily functioning raises two additional, rela-
tively novel and possibly more radical issues, regarding (3)
the desirability of an increased role for the individual in
health care and (4) the boundary between research and care
in ubiquitous monitoring.
Desirability of knowledge about future health
As discussed above, the cascade model hinges on the pre-
supposition that one’s current bodily state, represented by
the measurement of one or more biomarkers, enables pre-
dictions about one’s future health. Accompanying this ﬁrst
presupposition is a second one that implies that personal
bodily experience does not sufﬁce as a diagnostic tool. Both
presuppositions have already ﬁgured widely in all kinds of
programmes for early diagnostics and preventive screening,
e.g. for breast cancer or in predictive DNA diagnostics.
Many of the ethical questions raised by the use of bio-
markers for early diagnostics have been discussed in these
earlier settings (see for example Horstman et al. 1999;
Tijmstra 2004).
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health is questionable. Do we want to know what the future
holds for us? This may depend on the possibilities to act on
this knowledge. If effective preventive measures are
available or if early diagnosis implies that therapy may be
less drastic, predictive knowledge or early diagnosis seems
helpful. Often there is a gap, though, between diagnostic or
predictive possibilities and the therapeutic or preventive
options. Moreover, the impact of the diagnostic technology
itself may be quite far-reaching or pose more difﬁcult
questions than it can answer. Others argue that even if no
therapy is available, early diagnosis may help to prepare
for the unavoidable.
A common ‘solution’ to moral controversies like these is
that each individual should decide for him-/herself whether
or not to use these options for early diagnosis. People
cannot be obliged to use it, but the technology should be
available to all. Autonomy of citizens/patients is the central
value here. This solution neglects, however, that the
availability of such technologies invariably has cultural
implications. In a society offering extensive possibilities
for early diagnosis, a risk culture may evolve in which it is
common practice to reduce health risks as much and as
early as possible. The freedom to choose not to use these
possibilities may be severely limited. In addition, the
existence of such technologies forces people to explicitly
choose an attitude or lifestyle that was implicit before; in a
risk culture, for example, it will be more difﬁcult to
maintain a ‘carpe diem’ attitude.
This is related to another issue: choice comes with
responsibilities. If services exist, people will have to
explain why they do not use them. Is a person who refused
the opportunity to use biomarker tests or to be permanently
monitored responsible if he contracts a disease later on?
And what about insurance companies and employers? Can
they demand that you undergo such tests before accepting
you as a client or employee? In view of such consider-
ations, the desirability of knowing your future health risks
is, to say the least, not completely self-evident.
Predictive value and uncertain results
The cascade model of disease suggests that knowledge of
the future is desirable. In doing so, however, the model
presupposes that the link between the beginning and the
end of the cascade is strong and predictable. Past experi-
ences in predictive medicine warn us not to take such
presuppositions for granted. In the case of DNA diagnos-
tics, for example, high expectations regarding the predic-
tive value of DNA mutations were not met. As said before,
genetic mutations usually do not automatically lead to
disease; monogenetic diseases are the exception, not the
rule (Chanock and Wacholder 2002; Pagon 2002; Lock
2005). As a result, DNA diagnosis for multifactorial dis-
eases does not produce a clear message about one’s future
health. It results in risk statements, implying that even if
one has a high risk, in the end one might belong to the
minority that remains healthy.
Although molecular diagnostics is sometimes presented
as identifying the ﬁrst symptoms of (as contrasted with risk
factors for) disease, history may repeat itself here. If dis-
ease processes do not ﬁt the cascade model of disease
presupposed in molecular diagnostics, the predictive value
of biomarkers may be much lower than currently expected.
Biomarker tests will thus be nothing more than new tech-
nologies to identify (new) risk groups. Whether or not they
perform better than traditional risk factors can be decided
on a case-by-case basis only.
Anticipating the possibility that emerging molecular
diagnostic tests have low predictive value, we should
prepare for the question how to deal with such uncertain
test results. This is all the more important since molecular
diagnostic tests might be offered directly to consumers, e.g.
via internet companies. Who is best positioned to interpret
the meaning of such test results: a medical professional, the
client him-/herself, or representatives of the ‘life-long
health clinic’? Should tests with a very low predictive
value be forbidden or should the information provided
before testing satisfy speciﬁc criteria? In short, which
distribution of roles and responsibilities is desirable when
test results are ambiguous and unreliable? Again, the
example of DNA diagnostics shows that the actual practice
of testing and interpreting the test results may confront
users with more moral complexities than the issue whether
or not to have such a test (Boenink 2008).
The role of the individual
The conceptualization of disease as a deviation from one’s
personal pattern of individual bodily functioning assigns an
important role to the individual in determining the boundary
between health and disease. This role is motivated by both
practical and moral reasons. Freitas, for example, explicitly
states that what he calls ‘nanomedicine’ will personalize
disease in two ways: disease is either the failure to maintain
optimal bodily functioning (as dictated by one’s personal
bodily characteristics), or the failure to maintain one’s
desired functioning (as deﬁned by personal preferences)
(Freitas 2007, p. 167). He even announces that ‘‘the natural
end result of nanomedicine is fully permissive medicine’’
(Freitas 2007, p. 169), suggesting that an autonomous
choice to deﬁne oneself as healthy or ill should be
respected.
However, putting the autonomous individual central
stage, as Freitas does, both simpliﬁes and forecloses ethical
debate. In developing molecular medicine, the precise roles
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be deﬁned and distributed, and it is not a foregone con-
clusion that individual autonomy should always be deci-
sive. What is more, the meaning of autonomy itself, as well
as other concepts related to the value of the individual
person, may be transformed by the emerging practices of
molecular medicine, thus complicating moral decision
making.
First, the actual role of individuals in monitoring is not
fully determined by the material components of the tech-
nology. When using wet sensors, the subject him-/herself
need not have an active part in the measuring process,
besides having a sensor implanted. Both measuring and the
feedback of results can be organized in very different ways.
To whom, when and how are results communicated? How
are ‘results’ deﬁned anyway, and by whom? It is important
to realize that monitoring systems can be designed in very
different ways, with very different effects on the individual
user, on medical professionals and society at large. The
choices that need to be made when designing a monitoring
system are, therefore, morally laden.
In addition, the question should be asked how the
meaning of values related to the individual, like autonomy,
bodily integrity and privacy, is affected by the emergence
of complex monitoring systems. What does it mean to be
autonomous when your ‘health conscience’ is at least
partly outsourced to a technical system? Are wet sensors
integral to one’s body or external to it? Are the data
transmitted by these sensors to the system private?
Emerging technologies not only shift the conceptualization
of disease but are also prone to shifting the meaning of
moral values, which complicates the role of such values in
deliberations regarding the desirability of these technolo-
gies. Anticipating such potential shifts in meaning before
molecular medicine develops into a full-blown part of
medical practice could at least prevent such moral change
taking us by surprise later on.
Guarding the boundary between research and care
However, even if we accept that personalizing the deﬁni-
tion of disease is desirable, the necessary practice may
raise additional ethical issues regarding the boundary
between research and care. Although the projected ‘life-
long health clinic’ is primarily envisioned as a form of
care, it hinges on permanent and omnipresent examinations
of both healthy and diseased subjects. This opens up the
possibility for extensive comparative research. All indi-
viduals may beneﬁt from such research since epidemio-
logical knowledge will become more differentiated and
more reliable. One could argue, then, as some have done in
debates on biobanking (Chadwick 1997; Chadwick and
Wilson 2004; Swierstra 2004) that all individuals have a
civic obligation to participate in such research. It would,
after all, contribute to their own as well as to the public
good and it would hardly be burdensome for the individual.
This seems to make it less urgent to maintain a strict
boundary between research and care.
There are nevertheless considerations pulling in the
other direction as well. If care is tailored to individual
bodily functioning, it is actually also becoming ever more
experimental. How to determine when intervention is
necessary and which intervention would be best? If indi-
vidual proﬁles proliferate, testing all novel interventions on
subjects with an identical proﬁle will become impractical.
Knowledge based on reference populations will be less
available, thus making interventions less evidence-based.
Of course, medical interventions like drugs are currently
often (and also) applied to groups that were not included in
the experimental design. Since most clinical trials still use
young, male students, prescribing a new drug to anyone
outside this group is in a way experimental. The person-
alization of care promised by molecular medicine thus
clearly shows that medical interventions are often more
experimental than acknowledged, because they are con-
tinuously transported to new domains. This raises the
question whether the boundary between research and care
should be moved in the other direction: should not all
personalized care satisfy the strict criteria applied to
experimental research with human subjects?
Conclusion and discussion
Although molecular medicine is only just emerging, an
analysis of the concepts of disease implied by the visions in
this ﬁeld already enables us to anticipate some of its ethical
implications. The ‘cascade model’ of disease and the ‘per-
sonalized pattern model’ of bodily processes implied by
molecular medicine raise distinctive ethical issues. The
cascade model in particular builds on conceptions of disease
that have been around since the rise of preventive and
predictive medicine. As a result, some of the ethical issues
of predictive and preventive medicine resurface in molec-
ular medicine. The personalized pattern model, on the other
hand, diverges in important respects from existing models
of disease and poses relatively new questions and problems.
The ethical issues listed above might be summarized in
a preliminary ‘ethical agenda for molecular medicine’ that
comprises at least the following four items:
1. the desirability of the predictive knowledge produced
by molecular medicine;
2. the distribution of roles and responsibilities with
regard to the interpretation of test results, in particular
those with low predictive value;
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health and the shifting meaning of moral concepts such
as autonomy, bodily integrity and privacy;
4. the boundary between research and care and the level
of protection subjects should be guaranteed.
Of course, all these issues deserve more extensive analysis
and debate. Some of them will have to be addressed by
technology developers and medical professionals, whereas
others should be the subject of public or even political
debate. The analysis above is just a start.
Critics might claim that a similar ethical agenda could
have been constructed without the preceding concept
analysis. Since some of the items on the agenda are well
known from earlier ethical debates, these might have been
identiﬁed as well by reﬂecting on the analogies between
molecular medicine and earlier biomedical technologies, or
on a general set of ethical principles often at stake in
medicine. The approach proposed here has several distinct
advantages over these methods, however. It provides a
systematic and grounded basis for ethical agenda setting at
an early stage of technology development. Moreover,
contrary to more traditional ways of ethical agenda setting,
this approach acknowledges the mutual interaction (and
evolution) of technology and the goals of medicine.
Thus, using molecular medicine as an example, I hope
to have shown the usefulness of an analysis of concepts of
disease implied in emerging biomedical technologies for
ethical agenda setting on such technologies. Of course, one
example does not deﬁnitively demonstrate the general
value of the suggested approach. More research on differ-
ent types of emerging technologies is needed. However, I
do think that the preceding analysis illustrates how an
analysis of implied concepts of disease can lay bare
potential shifts in the goals of medical practice at an early
stage. This in turn may serve as a starting point for ethical
deliberation on the desirability of such shifts. Such debates
are often hampered by the fact that it is hard to determine
what a technology will be like when it is in an early stage
of development. It is even harder to determine which
implications it will have when it is introduced on a larger
scale. By using the future visions put forward by technol-
ogy developers themselves, it is possible to identify the
concepts of disease guiding the technological develop-
ments. Even when the material devices and any ensuing
practices are still uncertain and ﬂuid, the underlying con-
cept of disease is relatively clear and stable.
Identifying and analysing these concepts is thus a good
starting point to anticipate the ethical issues an emerging
technology may give rise to. It affords broader public and
professional debate on technological and scientiﬁc devel-
opment. Moreover, it enables the inclusion of ethical issues
in the further design of technological devices and of the
practices in which they will function. In this way, future
technological practices may be acceptable to most of the
parties involved and as a result will be relatively robust.
Let me ﬁnish here by pointing out two potential limi-
tations of the approach to ethical agenda setting for
emerging technologies outlined above. First, it is clear that
the approach proposed here is liable to speculation. By
taking the visions of technology developers as a starting
point, the ethicist risks going along with unfounded, far-
fetched claims on behalf of emerging technologies. As
Nordmann has argued, this may result in a speculative
ethics, deﬂecting scarce ethical resources from more
pressing issues (Nordmann 2007).
This risk should not be neglected. When selecting and
interpreting the technical and biomedical literature, a crit-
ical stance is needed to reject the claims missing scientiﬁc
underpinning and to distinguish expectations and promises
from downright science ﬁction. On the other hand, some
speculation is inevitable if ethical debate is able to steer
technology development. Analysing and debating the
future visions of serious scientists and engineers helps to
ﬁnd a mean between realistic but late and ineffective eth-
ical debate and completely speculative—and in the end
also ineffective—early ethical reﬂection.
In addition to the risk of speculation, the outlined
approach seems to point at another problem in ethics of
emerging technologies. The approach starts from the
observation that concepts of disease tend to shift when new
biomedical technologies emerge. It explicitly uses these
shifts to identify shifts in the goals of medicine. If these
goals shift, however, it is no longer clear how to go about
investigating the inﬂuence they have on disease. The
analysis above has shown that this is also true for addi-
tional moral values playing a role in medicine, such as
autonomy, bodily integrity or privacy.
Like the risk of speculation, this self-referential problem
is inherent to all ethics of emerging technologies, even to
all prospective ethics. Seen from an historical perspective,
morality is not a stable, permanent phenomenon. The
meaning and relative weight of moral values evolves over
time and technological and scientiﬁc developments play an
important part in triggering such evolution. Ethical analy-
ses of emerging technologies should start, therefore, from
the observation that both technology and morality are
dynamic. Moreover, they mutually interact.
Hence we cannot proceed as if current meanings of
disease and the related moral values are completely nor-
mative for the desirability of future developments. This is
not to say, however, that anything goes. We cannot but
judge future developments from our current standpoint but
we can do everything that is possible to broaden our point
of view. Imagining what the future might look like, in
technical as well as moral respects, is one way to ensure
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from such a broader point of view. It is in this respect that a
conceptual and ethical analysis of emerging technologies is
useful—even, or perhaps particularly, when both ontology
and morality are in constant ﬂux.
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